In his 1986 primer on determinism, John Earman introduces a mythical particle known as the freon.  The freon particle is described as a “freespirited species” because it is hypothetically posited to exist in a world within which deterministic laws affect all ordinary matter, while the freon particle is not subject to the same deterministic constraints. (p. 13)

The concept of the freon is presented immediately following an explication of a futuristically and historically Laplacian deterministic world whereby any two possible worlds W and W’ which are identical at any given point in time are by necessity identical for all time.  Thus, a perfect understanding of the instantaneous position and magnitude of all the fields and particles which constitute matter would provide insight into the past and future positions and magnitudes of all matter in a world of Laplacian determinism.

Against the backdrop of such a deterministic framework, Earman asks us to consider the existence of the freon particle, whose defining characteristic is that instantaneous knowledge of all freons and all of their properties would not be sufficient to determine their past or future behavior.

Immediately upon introducing the freon concept a second critical property of freons must be decided.  In addition to their “freespiritedness” or indeterminacy, it must be known whether freons interact with and affect regular matter in an observable manner.

Should freons be granted the ability to interact with ordinary matter, their influence would surely derail the deterministic nature of the observable world.  A freon particle free to interact with regular matter would, by necessity, introduce an unpredictable series of events into the “evolution” of the ordinary matter world. (p. 13)  This unpredictability arises due to the indeterminate nature of the freon’s future position and magnitude.  Thus, such a world would not exhibit Laplacian determinism, even if Laplace were only concerned with the behavior of “ordinary” matter. (p. 13)

Should freons instead be conceptualized as non-interactive, unpredictable and inconsequent particles, it would prove impossible to verify their existence.  Given that all measuring devices (including sense organs) are constructed from matter, these devices are only able to detect the influence of fields, particles and energies which interact with matter.  Therefore a non-interactive freon would be, by definition, unknowable.  In the case of non-interactive freons, the world would appear to exhibit Laplacian determinism and it would not be possible to know that there were in fact undetectable differences between worlds W and W’.  In Earman’s words, such particles would be nothing more than “unknowable ghosts in the deterministic machine.” (p. 13)

Earman introduces the freon particle to demonstrate the practical problems inherent in the notion of a semi-deterministic world.  His example illustrates that, for all intents and purposes, either everything obeys deterministic laws or nothing does.  The thought experiment proves that the non-deterministic portion of a semi-deterministic world is prima facie unknowable.  Unless one is willing to grant the indeterministic portions of reality an unjustified, separate but parallel existence, the effects of any indeterminate entities introduced into a determinate system overwhelm the deterministic components and render the entire system unpredictable.

The freon particle also demonstrates the necessity of Occam's razor.  Of course any number of imaginary items could be inserted into the philosophy of determinism to explain how the observable world comes to be, but one should not unnecessarily increase the number of entities required to explain any phenomenon.  By demonstrating the futility of introducing the non-interactive flavor of freon, Earman successfully illuminates a multitude of similar arguments which rely upon non-deterministic, unknowable forces.  Thus, the interactive freon provides a rich analogy alluding to the complex issues to be confronted by any theory of mind or argument for free-will.

Given that virtually all beings appear to hold an interest in their preservation, the most basic consideration any individual being can afford another is to respect its drive to continue existing.  The following will demonstrate that there exists a strong moral obligation to observe a vegetarian diet for all beings capable of comprehending this argument.

This paper examines the nature of, and reasons for, one’s moral obligations to their fellow beings.  It also examines to whom these obligations are owed and to whom these obligations apply.  The analysis contrasts the views of two prominent philosophers concerned with these questions, Peter Singer and Kenneth Goodpaster.  Focusing on areas of disagreement between their conceptions of who is worthy of moral consideration, it shall be demonstrated that both views prescribe a vegetarian diet as a consequence of their conclusions.

It should be noted that while there may exist a utilitarian argument obliging Western society to maximize the efficient use of resources by cutting out the production of flesh for human consumption, or an argument suggesting that one has a moral obligation to one’s self to enjoy the health benefits of a vegetarian diet, these issues are not examined here.  While there are many potential reasons to adopt a vegetarian diet, the following argument focuses on the moral obligations owed to those one would eat.

Philosopher Peter Singer is frequently credited with starting the modern animal rights movement.  (L. Pojman, P, Pojman, p.73)  Although his most widely read works were written in the 1970s, he is still considered to be one of the most influential thinkers of our time, as evidenced by his inclusion in Time Magazine's 2005 list of the world’s most influential People. (Caplan, 2005)  While a meta-ethical discussion regarding the existence of an absolute set of moral principles is beyond the scope of this discussion, it should be noted that Singer believes in such an absolute moral compass and he endeavors to discover a prescriptive set of moral principles using a classical act utilitarian approach.

Singer has strong views regarding why people have moral obligations to “animals” and what those moral obligations entail.  In his 1976 A Utilitarian Defense of Animal Liberation, Singer examines recent historical examples of the expansion of moral consideration within Western society from those with power (typically wealthy, “white” males of european descent) to a more inclusive morality which now encompasses all human beings.   Many opposed to this discrimination justify their argument by suggesting that a person’s sex, race or creed is no definitive indicator of his or her abilities. (Singer, 1976, p.75)  Singer cautions that this argument empowers those who wish to justify discrimination.  If differences in ability did prove to correlate with sex, “race” or creed, one employing this argument would have to concede that discrimination would be defensible. (1976, p.75)  Singer suggests that this argument is rooted in a fundamental misconception of the nature of our moral obligations and to counter it he proposes, “Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact...  The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a description of how we should treat humans.” (Singer, 1976, p.76)  Given his utilitarian framework, Singer would conclude that oppression of a minority (or of a majority by a powerful minority) by its nature causes more harm to the oppressed than it generates benefit for the oppressor.  In Singer’s view, actions are moral when they maximize total utility for all those who deserve moral consideration.

Singer warns, “If we wish to avoid being numbered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think even our most fundamental attitudes... If we can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently operated so as to benefit one group - usually the one to which we ourselves belong -  at the expense of another.” (1976, p.73)  While this is not the only ethical framework (those who view the world from a Kantian, deontological, or virtue ethics perspective would not be convinced by Singer’s reasoning), Singer’s argument uncovers key reasons why the modern West has rejected sexism, racism and many other similar “isms” relating to humans.

But should one accept humanity as an arbitrary limit below which morality has no prescription?  One might question just how wide a net should be cast when considering issues of moral consideration.  Singer accepts that “humanity” has long been the presumed floor for many concerned with ethics.  Historically, “To hold that brutes had rights was manifestly absurd.” (1976, p.74)  Yet this sentiment was adopted in the 1790s by critics of Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Women to demonstrate that, should we accept Wollstonecraft’s arguments in favor of women’s rights, we would be compelled to grant that these “brutes” must also deserve moral consideration. (Singer, 1976, p.74)  The modern West has accepted the bulk of Wollstoncraft’s thinking, but not the logical extension proposed by her critics.

By a similar thread, Singer asks us to consider, “If equality is to be related to any actual characteristics of humans, these characteristics must be some lowest common denominator, pitched so low that no human lacks them...  any such set of characteristics which covers all humans will not be possessed only by humans.”  (1976, p.79)  Using any objective set of criteria or guidelines that include the least able members of humanity (to whom we have already extended membership in the group of those deserving moral consideration) would also include the most able “animals” such as apes, monkeys, dolphins and dogs.  Put bluntly, the world’s smartest, most conscious and educated monkey is smarter, more conscious and more educated than the world’s dumbest, least conscious, most uneducated human.  Furthermore, Singer proposes, “Only some people are capable of leading intellectually satisfying lives, or morally good lives.” (1976, p.79)  This inconsistency holds true for any set of criteria one should care to choose in an attempt to create a clear division between humanity and the “brutes.”

In opposition to this argument, Singer asks us to grant that “Surely, every sentient being is capable of leading a life that is happier or less miserable than some other alternate life...  In this respect the distinction between humans and non-humans is not a sharp division, but rather a continuum along which we move gradually, and which overlaps between the species...” (1976, p.79)  Singer’s philosophy implores us to cast a wider net and to extend moral consideration to all “sentient” beings.  He clarifies that his definition of “sentient” includes only those beings capable of experiencing pleasure or pain. (1976, p.79)  But are these good reasons to accept “sentience” as the same morality floor previously extended to “white” males, “white” people, human beings, or in Singer’s view, “sentient” beings?  A contemporary of Peter Singer, Kenneth Goodpaster, says no.

In his 1978 work On Being Morally Considerable, Goodpaster suggests that “Neither rationality nor the capacity to experience pleasure and pain seem to me necessary (even though they may be sufficient) conditions for moral consideration.” (p.155)  In contrast to Singer, Goodpaster does not concede that moral consideration entitles one to equal moral worth as human beings: he rejects Singer’s use of sentience as the criterion upon which moral consideration should rest.  Singer claims that, “It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the side of the road by a schoolboy.  A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer...  A mouse, on the other hand, does have have an interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is.” (1976, p.77)  Goodpaster rejects Singer’s reasoning but not his conclusion (i.e., that rocks cannot suffer while mice can).  Singer’s claim that “If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account.  That is why the limit of sentience... is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interest of others“ is explicitly rejected by Goodpaster (Goodpaster, 1978, p.157)

Goodpaster proposes that, “Biologically, it appears that sentience is an adaptive characteristic of living organisms that provides them with a better capacity to anticipate, and so avoid, threats of life.  This at least suggests... that the capacities to suffer and to enjoy are ancillary to something more important...”  (1978, p.158)  According to this line of reasoning, the ability of a being to feel pleasure or pain is merely an adaptive biological response successful in preserving the interests of the organism.  Stated another way, the ability to feel pain is not the reason why one should avoid harm; it is simply an important method by which one can detect harm.  As a being, it is harm which is to be avoided, and pain which alerts one to the presence of harm.  Thus it is, prima facie, obvious that a self-preserving organism should avoid harm without pain over pain without harm.  Goodpaster further suggests that evolution might produce beings whose lives do not depend on the mechanisms of pain and pleasure. (1978, p.158)  Considering this, Singer’s criterion of sentience does not hold significance over any other criteria one may care to choose.  Goodpaster’s argument does not defeat the premise of Singer’s argument, it simply extends the reach of moral consideration to all beings.  Singer and Goodpaster can still agree “It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the side of the road by a schoolboy,” but Goodpaster would ask Singer to consider that a stone does not lack interests because it cannot suffer, it lacks interests because it has no drive to do, become, or preserve anything.  Thus, it is obvious that an area of contention for Singer and Goodpaster lies in the range “above“ rocks and “below” “sentient” beings.  A careful examination of Goodpaster’s case suggests that Singer should adopt Goodpaster’s conception of who deserves moral consideration.

Objecting to both Singer and Goodpaster, one might ask “Why should one feel obligated to grant moral consideration to non-human beings when non-human beings are not cable of comprehending, appreciating, or reciprocating our sentiments?”  There are many contradictions in this line of reasoning; human infants and others are equally incapable of such appreciation.  Yet, few would suggest that babies, severely mentally challenged individuals, or humans in temporary comas are undeserving of any moral consideration.  This objection stems from confusion between the concepts of moral consideration and moral responsibility.  Goodpaster urges us to consider that, “it seems arbitrary to draw the boundary of moral considerability around rational human beings (actual or potential), however plausible it might be to draw the boundary of moral responsibility there.” (1978, p.157)  Just because a being is not capable of understanding moral consideration does not mean that it is not deserving of moral consideration.  Similarly, children cannot be licensed to drive cars, but this does not mean that children should not be eligible to be driven, for these are separate and distinct cases requiring separate and distinct reasoning.  In Goodpaster’s view, these moral obligations are applicable only to “rational moral agents” and there is no reason to require that moral prescriptions must apply to anyone else. (1978, p.162)

Perhaps the strongest objection to a philosophy based on Goodpaster’s position (or Singer’s position including Goodpaster’s amendments) is that one cannot live according to the moral prescriptions which follow.  How can one grant moral consideration to each living being and still meet even the most basic functions of life?  Goodpaster anticipates this objection and replies by noting the distinction between “regulative and operative moral consideration.” (1978, p.162)  In Goodpaster’s view, we are obligated to follow genuinely life-respecting nutritional, scientific, and medical practices in the spirit of operative moral consideration, and not to the point of harm to ourselves.

Given these arguments, one might ask if there are any absolute moral prescriptions to be taken from the above analysis.  Singer’s explicit preference is to adopt a vegetarian diet.  He asks, “If we do not change our dietary habits, how can we censure those slaveholders who would not change their own way of living?” (1976, p.77)  Even in 1976, it had been established “beyond doubt that we could satisfy our need for protein and other essential nutrients far more efficiently with a diet that replaced animal flesh with... soy beans and other high-protein fruit and vegetable products.” (Singer, p.77)  Yet for Singer, plants fall below the threshold of sentience and are therefore unworthy of moral consideration.  Does Goodpaster’s expansion of moral consideration force one to reject Singer’s position?  Goodpaster admits that “We must eat, and this usually involves killing (though not always).  We must have knowledge, and sometimes this involves experimentation with living beings and killing (though not always).  We must protect ourselves from predation and disease, and sometimes this involves killing (though not always).” (1978, p.167)  This argument seems to prescribe that in order to practice a “life-respecting” existence, we should attempt to choose options that are implied by the “not always” caveats to his above concessions.  This would certainly include Singer’s dietary prescription for soybeans and other fruits (which are the byproducts of living beings) where possible, and other harm minimizing best-practices where a full avoidance of harm to those to whom we owe moral consideration is painfully counterproductive to our own existence.  This is the “sensitivity and awareness, not suicide” to which Goodpaster’s operational moral consideration refers. (1978, p.162)

Singer and Goodpaster may disagree on the specifics of their views, but it is clear that both argue for a drastic reorganization of society’s moral orientation toward “animals”.  While Singer extends absolute equality of moral consideration to all “sentient” creatures, and Goodpaster argues for vastly greater moral consideration of all beings, both make a compelling case for ending the needless exploitation of beings to satisfy the tastes of our own species.  Though a vegetarian diet is not a perfect solution to this lack of moral consideration, it is a physical manifestation of the desire to live by the operative moral prescriptions derived from a sober analysis of the issues.  If one is capable of comprehending this argument, one is a rational moral agent.  As such, one is compelled to extend moral consideration to all beings. Except in situations where it would be painfully counterproductive to one’s own existence, there is a strong moral obligation to observe a vegetarian diet.

Works Cited

Caplan, Arthur. (2005). Deep Ideas About Life. Retrieved from Time Magazine Online:
    http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/2005/time100/scientists/100singer.html
Goodpaster, Keneth. (1978). On Being Morally Considerable. In Pojman, L. & Pojman, P (Ed.),
    Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application (pp. 154-162). California:
    Thomson Higher Education.
Singer, Peter. (1976). A Utilitarian Defense of Animal Liberation. In Pojman, L. & Pojman, P (Ed.),
    Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application (pp. 73-82). California:
    Thomson Higher Education.

“The proof of the pudding is in the eating.” Cervantes' meaning is plain: qualities are revealed through trials. Scientific realists might go a few steps further to claim that existence is revealed through corroboration; "if it looks like pudding, smells like pudding, and tastes like pudding, chances are there exists pudding.” This logic can be extended from pudding down to the most mysterious quantum mechanical realms of existence. If a bowl of pudding is “real” then so are the electrons of the atoms of the molecules of the ingredients of which the pudding is made.

As suggested more formally by Richard Boyd in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Scientific Realism is the belief that, subject to a recognition that scientific methods are fallible and that most scientific knowledge is approximate, we are justified in accepting the most secure findings of scientists "at face value." (Boyd, 2002) This is especially pertinent for scientific investigation into the realm of the “unobservable” where many philosophical arguments against the scientific realist view have taken root. Through an investigation of some of the most celebrated arguments for and against scientific realism, the arbitrary nature of the anti-realist approach becomes apparent. In fact, a thorough review of the literature demonstrates anti-realism to be an all-or-nothing game where one is compelled to either believe in the reality of both pudding and electrons or neither.

The question of whether we are philosophically justified in believing that anything at all should be considered “real” is one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary metaphysics. (Miller, 2005) As such, any investigation into a specific branch of realist philosophy deserves at least a cursory glance into the general issue of realism. The realism debate is so diverse and nuanced that it would be impossible to give an informative overview of the entire range of positions here; however, while looking at the specific issues relevant to scientific realism, there are some key features of the larger debate which demand recognition. Within the contemporary debate on the philosophical status of generic realism there are two main camps of anti-realists: those who accept the existence dimension of the realist position and those who do not. (Miller, 2005) Using the pudding metaphor, an anti-realist who denies the existence dimension would deny reality to the pudding, the bowl, and the electrons of the scientific theories which postulate explanations for their nature. This position is a sophisticated group of metaphysical arguments beyond the scope of scientific realism. Given a reality defined by arguments against the existence dimension, the entire range of arguments for scientific realism would be defeated. Debates regarding scientific realism can only generate philosophical dialogue between realists and anti-realists who concede the existence dimension; scientific anti-realism is only particularly interesting if reality is granted to the every-day objects of existence.

For the purposes of this paper, James Ladyman’s simple and sweeping definition of scientific realism is adopted. According to Ladyman's 2007 article on structural realism: “Scientific realism is the view that we ought to believe in the unobservable entities posited by our most successful scientific theories.” This explanation preserves the spirit of the Boyd definition while giving a specific thesis to the scientific realist position. Namely: scientific theories predict unobservable entities which must be implicitly accepted as real upon acceptance of the theory which proposes them. This flavor of scientific realism is aptly named “entity realism” and it is this thesis which, in the absence of evidence in favor of the generic existence anti-realist argument, is advanced herein.

A strong form of the entity realist argument is presented by Grover Maxwell in his 1962 The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities. Maxwell is so convinced of the entity realist position that he begins the work by stating:

That anyone today should seriously contend the that the entities referred to by scientific theories are only convenient fictions, or that talk about such entities is translatable without remainder into talk about sense contents of everyday physical objects... strikes me as so incongruous with the scientific and rational attitude and practice that I feel this paper should turn out to be a demolition of straw men. (Maxwell, 1052)

Indeed, entity realism is often regarded as the default position within the realism / anti-realism debate; however, there are a number of arguments for the anti-realist position with enough substance that even staunch scientific realists like Maxwell feel obligated to respond. Following an examination of two of the strongest arguments in favor of the anti-realist position, two refuting arguments from the realist perspective are examined. Reflection upon both positions suggests that given reality, scientific realism is as obvious as Maxwell contends.

One of the most prominent arguments against scientific entity realism is known as the underdetermination or indeterminacy of data to theory argument. Like many of the arguments against entity realism, the underdetermination argument is not an argument which aims to prove anti-realism, it is instead an argument to illustrate flaws with the premises of entity realism. The concept of underdetermination can be traced back to Descartes’ First Meditation, where the extreme skepticism position is examined and Descartes famously concludes that his sensory perceptions do not provide enough information to conclude that he is in fact sitting by a fire. Descartes observes that there are a wide range of alternate explanations equally compatible with the available evidence, such as the hypothesis that he is dreaming about being by a fire or that he is experiencing a hallucination inflicted by an evil demon. (Devitt, 27)

Modern scientific theories suffer Descartes' concerns since it is incontestable that observational evidence is logically inconclusive in support of any specific theory. (Leplin, 119) Evidence in support of a given theory can only be viewed as support for such a theory through a process of ampliative reasoning, and ampliative reasoning is a direct application of inductive logic. Given David Hume’s famous and unresolved critiques of induction, it is obvious that there can be no logical argument proving a theory based on observed evidence.

However damaging one considers the underdetermination argument against scientific entity realism, it is only applicable to entity realism as an extension of a critique against realism as a whole. For just as years of subatomic investigation technically provide only “support” for the reality of electrons, so too does the sweet pudding taste only inductively suggest the reality of pudding in one’s mouth.

Given the above critique, anti-realists are forced to present an ampliative underdetermination argument within the framework of scientific skepticism to refute the realist position, since only the ampliative form of underdetermination challenges realism. Unfortunately for anti-realists who accept the existence dimension of the realist position, this argument structure means that any challenge to realism from underdetermination suffers from the same underdetermination problems of which it accuses entity realism. (Leplin, 122) The underdetermination argument is therefore at best unresolved.

Perhaps the most obvious critique of scientific entity realism, the superseeded science and associated selective confirmation arguments posit that the progressive nature of science is the best reason not to accept the factual existence of the entities assumed by the current leading theories. Given that previously successful theories of science have frequently proven to be false, and the entities assumed by those theories proven not to exist, why should one assume that the entities assumed by current theories will fare any better in the course of history? As Leplin puts it: “Does the history of theorizing not provide ample reason to distrust theories, regardless of the evidence that supports them?” (Leplin, 122) Through an analysis of three examples of non-existent past theoretical entities, Leplin makes a strong case against the superseeded science argument by separating the theory from the proposed entities.

Maxwell’s ether, Newton’s absolute space and Lavoisier’s fluid explanation of heat are three non-existant entities; yet at some point in history, each of these entities participated in well established scientific theories. However, a brief examination of these examples reveals a similar relationship between theory and entity which was not justified by the theory.

James Clerk Maxwell is famous for the equations he aggregated in electricity and magnetism which now bare his name. Maxwell’s equations describe the way that electromagnetic waves propagate through space but do not explain how waves are able to travel through a vacuum. To explain this feature of his work, Maxwell believed that there must exist an ether substance through which light waves traveled. Yet, as demonstrated by the continued application of Maxwell’s equations today, Maxwell’s equations themselves did not suggest or require the existence of an ether. Because of this, no amount of scientific confirmation of Maxwell’s equations lent any support for the existence of an ether substance. (Leplin, 125) Similarly, Lavoisier’s fluid was not necessary to explain the nature of heat and Newton himself was aware that his laws of motion did not require the existence of absolute space. In the final paragraph of the scholium to his 1687 Magnum opus Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica Newton states,

It is certainly very difficult to find out the true motions of individual bodies and actually to differentiate them from apparent motions, because the parts of that immovable space in which the bodies truly move make no impression on the senses.

Leplin attributes the brief popularity of these entities to a process he describes as selective confirmation. (Leplin, 124) Through the lessons learned from the examples described above, Leplin narrows the range of postulated entities which should be accepted by scientific entity realists. Specifically, he suggests that in order to allow confirmation of a theory to support the existence of a theoretical entity, the theory must owe its success to the entity.

By suggesting that realists must adopt criteria beyond simple participation in a theory which has empirical support, Leplin minimizes the success of the superseeded science and selective confirmation arguments. Given that narrowing of scope, Leplin’s most powerful assertion seems plain:

The major fundamental theories of current physics... are certainly the most severely tested theories ever, and they have proved flawless to a precision uncontemplated in the assessment of their predecessors. These theories are not thought to be the final word... but there is no reason to expect a [new] unifying theory to require their rejection. (Leplin, 122)

So long as the the theory owes its success to the entity and the theory itself has been corroborated by the “most severe testing” of modern science, the objections of the superseeded science argument are well mitigated.

Anti-realist proponents do not necessarily claim to disprove the realist position, instead they aim to place the burden of proof upon the realist position. Granting that the arguments above manage to cast some doubt on the realist position, what philosophical arguments are available to scientific entity realists? The following is a summary of two of the strongest arguments in favor of the entity realist position.

The first of these arguments for realism is detailed by noted anti-realist Bas Van Fraassen in his Concerning Scientific Realism. Van Fraassen describes the inference to the best explanation argument as the belief that given any evidence E, we should choose to believe an explanation H over and explanation H’ “exactly if H is a better explanation for E than H’ is.” (Van Fraassen, 1076) He further concedes that in “ordinary” or everyday situations we are able to use this technique with great success, following the mouse in the wall example borrowed from Willfrid Sellars. (Van Fraassen, 1076) Inference to the best explanation attempts to improve upon classical abduction by requiring that the explanation proposed is the best explanation available. Van Fraassen explains that following the above method of differentiating between explanations leads one to a default position of scientific realism because realism explains many instances of scientific evidence better than the non-explanation offered by anti-realists. Given that the anti-realist stance is a critique of realism and not a rival explanation, Sellars' argument appears valid at first glance.

Of course, Van Fraassen does not explain Sellars’ argument merely to defeat his own position. Van Fraassen believes that it is “less interesting to know whether people do follow such a rule of inference than whether they ought to follow it.” (Van Fraassen, 1077) By arguing that most people follow rules of inference only implicitly, Van Frassen proposes that Sellars' argument does not commit one to believing in unobservable entities. Instead of the Sellars formulation of the inference to the best explanation argument, Van Frasses demonstrates that one may only infer that H is “empirically adequate” if H is the best explanation for evidence E. (Van Fraassen, 1076) This change in formulation reduces the argument to the status of a psychological hypothesis and thus precludes its use as a philosophical instrument. Furthermore, anti-realists like Van Fraassen and realists like philosopher Alan Musgrave alike admit that in its basic form, inference to the best explanation is not a deductively valid argument. (Musgrave, 2008) While proponents of the realist position claim to have ‘rescued’ inference to the best explanation on a technical level through the application of a series of controversial addendums, the most obvious objection to this argument is that the best available explanation might be false. To this objection Musgrave replies:

It goes without saying that any explanation might be false, in the sense that it is not necessarily true. It is absurd to suppose that the only things we can reasonably believe are necessary truths. (Musgrave, 2008)

Musgrave's reasoning demonstrates that, technical controversies and logical footwork aside, the inference to the best explanation argument raises important questions for anti-realists; however, the most compelling argument for scientific entity realism can be completely distilled to the comments of Philosopher Hilary Putnam. Putnam eloquently declared that realism is “the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle.” (Musgrave, 1099) This statement has become known as the Miracle argument, which in a more formal composition states that: only entity realism can explain the success and usefulness of the scientific theories which owe their explanatory power to the proposed entity in question. The miracle argument is simply an illustration of the lack of a usable conter-theory to back-up the anti-realist position. Even Van Fraassen skirts this issue in his condemnation of the miracle argument and responds instead with rhetoric and metaphor.  Suggesting that scientific theories survive through a process akin to darwinian evolution, Van Fraassen states that the survival of any scientific theory in the absence of realism is no more miraculous than the existence of any specific organism within nature. (Van Fraassen,1088)

In his lengthly reply to Van Fraassen’s comments, Musgrave rejects this explanation and accuses Van Frassen of confusing two similar issues. Van Fraassen gives an explanation for why existing scientific theories are successful, but does not address the more important question of why a given theory might survive in competition with other equally likely theories, assuming an anti-realist perspective. Both the realist and the anti-realist are free to accept Van Fraassen’s answer without violating their position since competition among alternative theories neither requires nor precludes a realist view. (Cover and Curd, 1245) However this does nothing to address the question of why, in the absence of real entities, scientific theories are successful. On behalf of all anti-realists, Van Fraassen gives no answer. (Cover and Curd, 1245)

Musgrave further suggests that the miracle or “ultimate” argument for scientific entity realism is most convincing when applied to novel predictive success. Since the observation of newly predicted, previously unobserved regularities greatly corroborates a theory, and given that, per Leplin’s conditions, the theory must owe its success to the posited entity, the sole explanation for the general success of this type of scientific experiment is entity realism. Musgrave sums up the situation simply with the opening paragraph of his The ‘Miracle Argument’ For Scientific Realism when he says: “Scientific realism is the view that science seeks the truth and sometimes finds it.” (Musgrave, 2008) It seems obvious that the best explanation of such miracles is that scientific realism uncovers the truth to which Musgrave refers.

Grover Maxwell felt that his this critique of anti-realism would turn out to be a demolition of straw men, but in the end there were no straw men to demolish. The debate between entity realists and anti-realists is not a comparison of two conflicting worldviews, it is simply one complete philosophy versus a denial of that view. Anti-realists maintain that there exists no logically compelling reason forcing them to accept the reality of unobservable entities postulated by leading scientific theories. In this assertion they are correct. None of the realist arguments such as the “inference to the best explanation” or “miracles” can prove the existence of unobservable entities.  However, these arguments do successfully demonstrate that it is more logical to accept the reality of unobservable entities than to not.

In contrast to the realist assertions, anti-realist arguments such as underdetermination, superseeded science, and selective confirmation do not generate arguments for an anti-realist solution; they merely cast doubt on the realist position. If it is true that “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”, where is the anti-realist meal? The anti-realist position lacks an argument and cannot propose an alternative hypothesis. The anti-realist position is a dogmatic cry to: ‘remain skeptical’ for skepticism’s sake. This is the ultimate power of the “ultimate” or argument; it clearly places the burden of proof on the anti-realist position. Yet with no mechanism for explanation, the anti-realist are only able to advance their own untestable counter-arguments. This is surely worse than following a psychological hypothesis strengthened by observational evidence.

Entity realism is the default position within the realism / anti-realism debate for good reason. Upon reviewing two of the strongest arguments for both perspectives, scientific realism is as obvious today as Maxwell contended over fifty years ago. Assuming that anything is real, if one accepts that the success of science is more than just a constant and replicated miracle, one should believe as strongly in electrons as in plain old pudding.

Works Cited

Boyd, Richard “Scientific Realism” at The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ (Accessed April 23, 2008)

Devitt, Michael “Underdetermination and Realism” in Sosa, Ernest and Villaneueva, Enrique. Realism and Relativism : Blackwell Publishing. (2003)

Hacking, Ian “Experimentation and Scientific Realism” in Curd, Martin and Cover, J. A. Philosophy of Science, New York : W.W. Norton and Company. (1998)

Kukla, Andre and Walmsley, Joel “A Theory’s Predictive Success does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates” in Hitchcock, Christopher. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, Malden : Blackwell Publishing. (2004)

Ladyman, James “Structural Realism” at The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/ (Accessed April 23, 2008)

Leplin, Jarrett “A Theory’s Predictive Success can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates” in Hitchcock, Christopher. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, Malden : Blackwell Publishing. (2004)

Maxwell, Grover “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities” in Curd, Martin and Cover, J. A. Philosophy of Science, New York : W.W. Norton and Company. (1998)

Miller, Alexander “Realism” at The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ (Accessed April 23, 2008)

Musgrave, Alan “Realism versus Constructive Empiracism” in Curd, Martin and Cover, J. A. Philosophy of Science, New York : W.W. Norton and Company. (1998)

Musgrave, Alan “The ‘Miracle Argument’ For Scientific Realism” at The Rutherford Journal, http://www.rutherfordjournal.org/article020108.html (Accessed April 23, 2008)

Newton, Isaac, Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (“Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy”), London. (1687)

Putnam, H. Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers, volume 1, London: Cambridge University Press. (1975)

Van Fraassen, Bas “Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism” in Curd, Martin and Cover, J. A. Philosophy of Science, New York : W.W. Norton and Company. (1998)

Modern physics can trace its origins to the “Annus Mirabilis” of 1905 when Albert Einstein published, among others, On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies and introduced the world to his Special Theory of Relativity. (Hsu and Yang, 2001)  This event is often touted as the birth of a new of “Einsteinien” era of physics which is said to have replaced the old “Newtonian” view held until that point. (Weinberg, 1998)  Due partially to Thomas Kuhn’s popularized use of the term “revolution” to describe these shifts in scientific paradigms, and partially to Einstein’s explicit use of the word “Relativity,” the long history of the transition from Newton’s conception of absolute space to a more relativistic view has often been obscured by Einstein’s sudden achievements.  Despite the recent attention paid to modern concepts of relativity, the dispute between supporters of absolute space and those proposing a relative conception of position dates back to at least Newton’s lifetime.  This debate was famously captured in an exchange of correspondence in 1715 and 1716 between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and one of Newton’s most ardent supporters, Samuel Clarke.  Originally published in 1717 as the epistolary “Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence,” the debate touched on a wide range of scientific, theological and philosophical concerns, but is of primary interest to philosophers of science as a record of Leibniz’s refutation of Newton’s absolute conception of space.

The basic conception of the relativity of space can be traced to Galileo Galilei, who first described this principle in his 1632 work, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems.  As demonstrated by Galileo’s famous ship thought experiment, the fundamental laws of physics are the same in all inertial frames.  This version of relativity, commonly referred to as Galilean relativity, was widely accepted by the time of the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence.  Newton explicitly used the process known as Galilean Transformation in order to translate between separate inertial frames, and Galileo’s general work formed much of the basis of what is now known as Newtonian Mechanics. (Wolf, 2008)  Despite Newton’s acceptance of an infinite number of inertial reference frames, he was adamant that there existed a ‘real’ space which acted as a background against which all objects moved.  It is this notion, sometimes known as the ‘container’ view of space, to which Leibniz directly objects within his correspondence with Clarke.

Newton’s belief in absolute space was well established in his 1687 Magnum opus Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica which contains explicit statements such as the following:

I do not define time, space, place, and motion, as they are well known to all. Absolute space by its own nature, without reference to anything external, always remains similar and unmovable.

By this and other similar statements, Newton demonstrates his belief in absolute motion and defines the concept as change from one place in absolute space to another.  While the Principia presupposes absolute space for the purposes of conceptualizing absolute motion, the experiments and mechanics within the Principia do not rely upon absolute space to prove Newton’s conclusions.  Newton was clearly aware of this fact as the final paragraph of the scholium states,

It is certainly very difficult to find out the true motions of individual bodies and actually to differentiate them from apparent motions, because the parts of that immovable space in which the bodies truly move make no impression on the senses.

Despite the admitted problems with discerning ‘true motion’ from mere ‘apparent motion,’ Newton held to his belief in absolute space and developed detailed thought experiments to illustrate his reasoning.  The most famous of these experiments, “The Bucket Experiment” attempts to prove the existence of absolute space by appealing to the phases of motion of spinning water in a spinning bucket.  Through a series of increasingly abstract examples, Newton leads the reader to conclude that the concept of spin relies upon the existence of absolute space since the concavity of the water’s surface is the result of the water’s spin with respect to absolute space. (Newton, 1687)

Despite this argument, Leibniz was unconvinced of the reality of Absolute Space and in his letters to Clarke he relies chiefly on two specific metaphysical principles, namely the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, to refute his claim.

Leibniz’s argument against Absolute Space based on the principle of sufficient reason is launched in earnest in his third reply to Clark when he states in his second point, “Clarke grants me this important principle, that nothing happens without a sufficient reason why it should be so rather than otherwise. But he grants it only in words and in reality denies it.”  Clarifying his position in point four, Leibniz continues: “For my part, I have said several times that I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is, taking space to be an order of coexistences...” but it is his fifth point where Leibniz truly lays out the argument.  As an introduction to a full examination of his argument, Leibniz proves his point in a brief overview when he states that “The demonstration argues that if space were an absolute being, something would be the case for which there couldn’t possibly be a sufficient reason - which conflicts with my axiom, and thus implies that space is not an absolute being.”

In paraphrase of Leibniz’ full argument, University of Puedue Professor of philosophy of science, Martin Curd explains,

Suppose that absolute space exists. Thus, the world as a whole has some position in it. But, in that case, when God created the world, there could have been no reason for placing the world in one position as opposed to another. But since the [Principle of Sufficient Reason] is true, there must be a reason for everything. Therefore, absolute space does not exist.

Leibniz’s argument against Absolute Space based on the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is presented together with his first argument but it is none the less a separate philosophical issue.  As discussed at length in Leibniz’s fourth paper, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles suggests that if two things have exactly the same properties, then they are identical.  The implication of this principle is that a second universe where all matter were shifted together in one direction would be indiscernable from, and thus identical to, our universe.  Leibiniz believed that given the truth of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, Absolute Space becomes a meaningless concept.

While it is recognized that many of Leibniz’s arguments supported by the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, such as his argument against atomism outlined in his fifth letter, were false; it is clear that Leibniz’s arguments were attempts to use the philosophical tools available in order to support what he saw as a logical necessity.  The totality of the arguments outlined in the Leibniz-Clarke papers demonstrate that in contrast to Newton, Leibniz intuitively understood that space is merely a relational property of objects.  As Leibniz himself suggests after the introduction of his arguments: “...that is just one of several reasons that I have for holding that there is no empty space at all.”

In the end, it may have been the clarity with which Newton conducted his abstract thought experiments which lead to the success of his arguments.  Despite the objections of Leibniz, the first serious challenge to Newton’s Bucket Experiment were not published until Ernst Mach examined the issue in his 1872 History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy.  In fact, Newton’s arguments seem to have somewhat derailed Leibniz’s own train of thought as demonstrated by Leibniz’s admission of Newton’s concept of Absolute Motion. As demonstrated by Leibniz and discussed at length by Bertrand Russell, contrary to his own lines of reasoning Leibniz concedes,

I find nothing in the eighth definition of the Mathematical Principles of Nature nor in the scholium belonging to it, that proves, or can prove, the reality of space in itself, However, I grant there is a difference between an absolute true motion of a body, and a mere relative change of its situation with respect to another body.  For when the immediate cause of the motion is in the body, that body is truly in motion. (Russell, 1900)

Unfortunately, Leibniz’s exchange with Clarke was cut short by Leibniz’s death in 1716.  Never the less, Leibniz’s assertion of the immateriality of space paved the way for the type of thinking which lead to the modern concept of relativity.  While it is true that Leibnizian relationism is regarded as deficient by today’s standards, many of the issues disputed in the Leibniz-Clarke papers were not definitively decided until the 20th century.  As such, when discussing the transition from Newtonian Mechanics to Einsteinian Relativity, credit for inciting the revolution is due to Leibniz.

Works Cited

Einstein, Albert “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies” in Hsu, Jong-Ping and Zhang, Yuan-Zhong. Lorentz and Poincare invariance, River Edge, N.J. : World Scientific Publishing Co. (2001)

Leibniz, G.W. and Clarke, Sameul “The Leibniz-Clarke Papers” at Early Modern Texts, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/leibclar.html (Accessed February 16, 2008)

Weinberg, Steven “Steven Weinberg on Scientific Revolutions.” New York Review of Books, Vol XLV, Number 15 (1998)

Galilei, Galileo "Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems” University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/galileo/dialogue.html (Accessed February 16, 2008)

Wolf, Joe “Galilean relativity and Newtonian mechanics: an introduction” University of New South Wales School of Physics, http://www.phys.unsw.edu.au/einsteinlight/jw/module1_Galileo_and_Newton.htm (Accessed February 16, 2008)

Newton, Isaac, Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (“Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy”), London. (1687)

Smith, George “Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-principia (Accessed February 16, 2006)

Russell, Bertrand, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz New York, N.Y. : Routledge (1900)

Curd, Martin “Leibniz versus Newton (Clarke) on Space and Time” at Purdue University Department of Philosophy, http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~curd/LCC.html (Accessed February 16, 2008)

In Treatise of Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume raises serious issues with the logic of inductive reasoning.  Despite many attempts to address Hume’s concerns, these issues have remained problematic for philosophers to this day.  In The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses, John Earman and Wesley C. Salmon examine some of the most historically significant and compelling attempts to resolve Hume’s problem of induction.  While in each case, Earman and Salmon object to the solution given, Hans Reichenbach’ pragmatic vindication is most promising since it acknowledges Humes’ concerns without discarding the necessity of induction.

Hume’s argument divides all reasoning into two types: reasoning of ideas and reasoning concerning matters of facts and existence. (Salmon, 55)  While the first class, which includes deductive and a priori knowledge, can be vindicated through elementary logical analysis, Hume argued that no such logical support can be found for reasoning of the second class.  This second class of inductive reasoning cannot be proven to be logically valid because the conclusion goes beyond the content of the premises. (Salmon, 55)  Yet it is only through these ampliative modes of reasoning that one can gain additional understanding of the world, since by definition, deductive reasoning is non-ampliative and therefore gives no information not implicitly contained in the premises.  While this may appear trivial and semantic, Hume has successfully argued that there is no logical basis for placing any confidence in any scientific hypothesis. (Salmon, 58)  Earman and Salmon conclude that despite numerous attempts to “resolve or dissolve” Hume’s problem, no consensus has emerged and it remains to this day a crucial matter of “unresolved business” for philosophy. (Salmon, 66)

Among the attempts to resolve Hume’s problem examined by Earman and Salmon, Goodman’s inductive intuition and Popper’s deductivism are inferior to Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication because they attempt to reject one of the two established results of Hume’s argument.

Goodman’s inductive intuition can be rejected because it misrepresents the criteria for accepting deductive reasoning, then applies that logic to induction.  Goodman suggests that both inductive and deductive logic conform to general rules and that “a rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule that we are unwilling to amend.” (Salmon, 62)  However, Deduction differs from induction in that deduction can be supported by general proofs.  Since no general proof exists which illustrates inductive logic as necessarily truth-preserving, Goodman’s arguments never successfully overcome Hume’s core criticism of inductivism.  In fact, Goodman’s “new riddle” of induction serves to illustrate that the logical justification of induction requires induction, and is thus rejected as circular reasoning. (Salmon, 63)

Popper’s deductivism accepts Hume’s criticisms of induction and attempts to resolve Hume’s problem by postulating that scientific reasoning does not rely on induction.  Popper claims that an explanation of the scientific framework can be constructed appealing solely to deductive logic; however, his argument suffers from a serious limitation.  Popper suggests that while confirmation of a scientific hypothesis is impossible without a logical proof vindicating inductive logic, using a criterion of falsifiability scientific theories obtain a level of legitimacy based on their past performance. Popper calls this measure of historical success corroboration. (Salmon, 64)  Popper’s adherence to corroboration does not allow theoretical science to make predictions since corroboration has no logical connection to future events.  Because of this feature, Popper’s deductive science it is unable to provide ampliative information and thus does not solve Hume’s problem.

In contrast to Popper and Goodman, Reichenbach accepts both Hume’s assertion that science requires induction and that there is no strictly logical basis for accepting inductive reasoning.  Specifically, Reichenbach acknowledges that inductive reasoning may lead to false predictions since there is no logical basis for assuming that nature will extend uniformly into the future. (Salmon, 64)  Following Hume’s logic, Reichenbach accepts that if nature is uniform, induction will have good predictive power.  He concedes that if nature is not uniform, induction will provide no logical basis for predicting future events.  Reichenbach goes on to consider the implications of not using the method of induction under the same circumstances.  Earman and Salmon summarized Reichenbach’s results in the table below: (Salmon, 65)

Since any method of future prediction may occasionally produce successful results, there is no reason to assume that not using induction would logically guarantee an unsuccessful result.  However, there is also no logical reason to assume that such a method would succeed.  The result is unknown because there is no logical reason to expect consistent results.

The crucial point made by Reichenbach is that any method of prediction used successfully to produce consistent results can be harnessed by inductive reasoning to make accurate predictions of the future.  If every method of prediction were to cease producing accurate results, then by definition no method of future prediction would be successful.   Because of this, Reichenbach concluded that if any method of predicting future events is successful, induction will be successful, and that if induction is not successful, no method can be successful; hence “pragmatic vindication.”

Given that the chart above exhaustively lists all possible methods for predicting the future, the only logical choice for making predictions of the future is induction since no other option can ever yield better results.

As stated, Reichenbach’s argument appears to give a logical vindication of induction as a method of decision-making while accepting ampliative results from science.  Yet Earman and Salmon are quick to point out that the argument “as stated” is not an accurate representation of reality due to the vagueness of Reichenbach’s  classifications.  This is a just concern, first raised by Reichenbach himself. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006)  Specifically, Earman and Salmon suggest that the results chart does not exhaustively list all possible outcomes.  In their critique they state that past observations suggest that nature is neither strictly uniform nor completely random and further demonstrate that the class “non-inductive methods” is actually an infinite number of methods which each require individual evaluation.  Based on this granularity of nature’s potential uniformity and the infinity of non-inductive methods available, Earman and Salmon suggest that Richenbach’s method vindicates an infinite class of rules. (Salmon, 66)  This implies that in practice, pragmatic vindication can be used to justify any rule which “converges in the limit to the true limiting frequency (of some type of outcome O in a sequence of events) whenever such a limiting frequency exists” and is therefore inappropriate as a general solution to Hume’s problem of induction. (Juhl, 1994)

Despite this shortcoming, Reichenbach has succeeded in creating a logical vindication of induction at a conceptual level and the compelling simplicity of his solution has inspired modern philosophers to search for additional constraints to save the model technically.  Specifically, Cory F. Juhl’s inclusion of a speed-optimality constraint has revived pragmatic vindication as a serious area for academic inquiry and a possible solution to Hume’s problem of induction. (Juhl, 1994)  Even as originally conceived, Reichenbach’s method succeeded where Goodman and Popper failed by providing a framework consistent with “everyday experience” which correctly represents the nature of induction and admits ampliative statements into the realm of science.  While Reichenbach may not have solved Hume’s problem of induction, his argument illustrates key features of the nature of inductive logic.  More importantly, Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication provides an excellent model for the human thought process which, as even Earman and Salmon concede, allows us to “go on in spite of these troubling philosophical doubts.” (Salmon, 66)

Works Cited

"The Problem of Induction" Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (November 15, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem

Earman, John and Salmon, Wesley C., The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses in M. Salmon et al. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1992.

Juhl, Cory F. “The Speed-Optimality of Reichenbach's Straight Rule of Induction.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45.3.857 (1994) 857 - 863